Party Competition, Constraints to Negotiate and Economisation – Changes in Municipal Decision-Making: the Example of North Rhine-Westphalia

I. Introduction

Local self-government was long considered a comparatively "unpolitical" matter. Theodor Eschenberg took the view that there was no such thing as Christian Democratic street lighting or Social Democratic public toilets, in other words that detailed solutions are as a rule unpolitical. Since the end of the 60s, however, the local level in cooperative federalism has increasingly become a subject of debate in political science and urban studies. Concern with local government decision-making structures and processes has a particularly long tradition in Germany. In the 90s, this discussion ebbed somewhat in the face of German unification and European integration. Nevertheless, local authority practice has experienced considerable changes. Measures to modernise administration following private sector management models (public management), the reform of local government constitutions on the model of the South German council constitution (on Baden-Württemberg lines) with a directly elected mayor and the introduction of the citizen initiative and referendum, and the advance of cooperative forms of public involvement are changing power positions in the municipal decision-making system.(1) This study focuses on local government decision-making processes (2) in the narrower sense, on interaction between top administration, the local council, the citizenry, and political parties. Whereas the literature has generally tended to discuss the three aspects of modernisation separately, this study attempts a more "holistic" treatment on the basis of empirical findings on local government decision-making in North Rhine-Westphalia.

The empirical field of study is medium-sized and large cities in North Rhine-Westphalia. A wide range of empirical studies (3) as well as own surveys (4) provide the basis for this study. NRW is particularly interesting because it has always offered the most conspicuous example for party rule at the local level, thus presenting a counter-model to the South German council constitution. The gap between constitutional norms and reality has been regarded as especially wide in NRW. And reform of the local government constitution has, in relative terms, produced the greatest institutional changes (in the old federal states). NRW has also made particularly strong progress in implementing administrative modernisation.

Whereas the urban studies discussion on municipal decision-making processes has generally been associated with the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of various local government constitutional arrangements or the related models of political administrative leadership, this study proposes in its examination of the local decision-making system to take greater account of political systems and public policy studies, relating them to the local level. Particular attention is paid to links between majoritarian and negotiation-democracy arrangements.(5) The central thesis is as follows. A new arrangement is developing between competitive and negotiation-democracy elements at the local government level. Both the direct-democracy elements of direct mayoral election (6) and referendum and the development of cooperative forms of democracy are regarded here as elements of negotiation democracy.(7) While in states with the North German council constitution and in medium-sized and big cities as a whole, competitive-democracy structures had developed since the 70s with strong party polarisation as in parliamentary systems of government, the progress of negotiation-democracy elements is now putting pressure on such structures.

The following section reconstructs the "starting situation" for possible change. Then the modernisation trends of the 90s are described (III), and, finally, the impact on power positions in the local government decision-making system (IV) is discussed.

II. The Local Government Decision-Making System in NRW until the End of the 80s

The local decision-making system is path-dependent in two senses.(8) It is determined by the historical understanding of the role of local self-government and by institutional arrangements and experience with their operation. In the German self-government tradition, local self-government is often regarded as quasi-unpolitical, non-profit, local action, as self-government competence conferred and supervised by the State, as a subsystem of society. However, at least since the Vormärz period, the years preceding the 1848 revolution, there has also been a notion of local self-government as an expression of democratically constituted community freedom, as an autonomised political entity, as a component of the State. I suggest that, since about 1870,(9) the thesis that there is an essential difference between the local government and the State level has not been tenable. At the latest with the abolition of the three-class franchise and the introduction of universal and equal proportional representation at the local level, too, a major turning point was reached. The status of the local authority as a politically autonomous entity was enhanced and the advance of political parties into local self-government was facilitated. Nonetheless, neither in the Weimar Republic nor in the Federal Republic have local authorities succeeded in becoming a third, equal basic factor in the political order along with the federation and the states. From a legal point of view and in the minds of many people, the notion of the dualism of State and local authority persists, a concept that continues to permeate not inconsiderable sections of urban research.(10)

After the Second World War, a range of different local government constitutional systems was adopted, based on historical models and influenced by the respective occupying power. In NRW the monistically oriented North German council constitution was introduced, which vests all decision-making powers in the municipal council, with the administration carrying out orders in a "depoliticised" manner on the British model. Until the beginning of the 90s, this local government constitution led to the development in NRW - in contrast to South German states - of more fragmented leadership structures, to greater party competition, to more self-confident councils, to more intensive links between politics and administration, and to a stronger exercise of parliamentary control functions by council opposition parties - all factors in a more competitive-democracy type of politics. The effects of party competition are reinforced by the relatively large size of municipalities in NRW, since party politicisation increases with the size of the community and political parties assume an important orientation function.

The combination of bigger communities and a local government constitution focused on the local council is one of the most important reasons for the dominance of party competition in NRW. Other factors also play a role, such as growing public pressure in key local policy areas, the state-wide entry of the GREENS into local councils, and a different understanding of local self-government among younger council members, factors which are also to be found in other states in Germany. In larger cities with a South German council constitution, however, these effects of party politicisation are weakened by certain provisions of the municipal constitution (direct election of the chief executive officer, committee chairmanship for the mayor, the possibility of vote accumulation and splitting, greater mayoral personnel powers). They can be seen as precautions against increasing party polarisation, whereas the North German local government constitution has nothing to set against this general trend, or even encourages it by granting the local council a great deal of scope (generalized powers).

Nevertheless, in view of the latent concept of concordance democracy in municipal politics, local government politicians and citizens in NRW, too, link concordance and competitive-democracy notions. This is expressed, for example, by local politicians performing different roles. The strong position of party competition in NRW is only slightly limited by the general tendency towards administrative dominance. This is primarily because politics and administration are so closely interlinked in local government practice. This interlinkage is provided for in all state local government statutes, since the local council is seen as part of self-government and the administration prepares the decisions to be taken by the council, but increasing party politicisation has amplified it, especially in NRW. An informal, party-politically oriented circle of "preliminary decision-makers" from administration and council has developed into the real decision-making centre for municipal action. The most important function of such preliminary decision-making circles is to short-list decisions and make them "watertight" before presenting them to a broader public or competing parties.

Until the beginning of the 90s, negotiation-democracy elements were relatively little in evidence in North Rhine-Westphalia. Local corporatism is to be found primarily in the fields of social and labour market policy and, to a limited extent, in business promotion. These corporatist arrangements have mostly arisen not endogenously but exogenously, through policy interdependencies. Moreover, social and labour-market policy are not key local government policy areas, at least not in the view of local decision-makers.(11) In NRW, concordance-democracy traditions are also far less pronounced at the local level (owing to the institutional setting and differences in the size of municipalities) than in South German states, and have been further curbed with the growing pressure of problems in central policy areas and the intensification of party competition caused by the arrival of the GREENS in local councils. Before the 1994 reform of the state local government statute, there were also hardly any institutional veto positions. In the field of cooperative democracy there are isolated and not very wide-spread experiments. The focus in citizen involvement is on developing formal opportunities for participation, which generally offer little right to be heard and hardly any share in decision-making. This is the background to the modernisation measures introduced in the 90s.

III. Modernisation Trends in the 90s

Major changes took place in local government practice during the 90s. They concerned primarily the internal world of local political processes and started by addressing the efficiency of municipal institutions. In the late 90s the institutional foundations of local politics as well as internal processes and structures had begun to change. Three different modernisation trends can be identified.(12)

• From 1992 the first municipalities began to introduce administrative modernisation measures on the model of private sector management (public management). Public management includes both internal modernisation processes and the question of reorienting government tasks. In German practice, strongly influenced by the KGSt (the largest local government association in Germany) and the New Steering Model (NSM) it recommends, internal modernisation predominates. The aim of the NSM is first to enhance the efficiency of work organisation by introducing decentralised resource responsibilities and outcome-oriented procedures, and second to improve the controllability of political organisation (13) by a concentration on strategic goal formulation made possible by reducing the influence of the council on policy implementation processes, a new committee structure, and an expanded reporting system. If local government administrative authorities initially hesitated to accept the New Steering Model, from about 1995 it could be said to have found wide-spread acceptance.



• Starting in East Germany, a general trend developed from 1991 to reform local government constitutions along the lines of the South German council constitution (on Baden-Württemberg lines) with a directly elected mayor and the introduction of the citizen initiative and referendum.(14) With the exception of Baden-Württemberg, all territorial states (as opposed to city-states) in Germany have amended local government constitutional arrangements. The representative-democracy forms of political decision-making that had existed at the local level for over 40 years in the old states of the Federal Republic have thus been supplemented by direct democracy forms,(15) and, despite all the differences that persist, the local government constitutional world has been harmonized to an almost inconceivable degree.(16) This is all the more remarkable considering that it is a decentralized political decision-making process.



• As the budgetary difficulties of local authorities have grown, the discussion in local government practice since about 1997 on intensifying citizen engagement in the sense of involving the public in the provision of services and in local democracy revived at the end of the decade. Two strings of discussion overlap, the old participation debate about citizen involvement, which discusses the citizen as political client, and the new debate on forms of co-production, in which the citizen assumes the role of collaborator. Apart from these discussions, which primarily address the collaborator role, new forms of participation and joint decision-making are to be assigned to the cooperative democracy domain, including mediation procedures; future workshops; neighbourhood forums; round tables; community work; planning cells; public order partnerships; citizen budgets; labour-market, care, and neighbourhood conferences; and Local Agenda processes. Elements of cooperative democracy address both individual citizens and societies, public interest groups, and associations. They are characterised by voluntary, dialogistic procedures directed towards cooperative problem-solving. In the 90s there were growing signs that elements of cooperative democracy were increasingly coming into play in municipalities.

What impact do the three modernisation trends (NSM, direct-democracy elements, cooperative democracy) have on the municipal decision-making system and the power positions of individual actors and groups of actors? What shifts in power result, what role does the directly elected, full-time mayor assume; or, in more general terms: Is a new model of political administrative leadership emerging?

IV. Effects on Power Positions in the Municipal Decision-Making System

This section examines the effects of modernisation measures on the power positions of top administration, city council, citizens, and parties - on the actors in the local decision-making system in the narrower sense. Modernisation measures are first looked at separately, then considered together in their impact on individual actors.

a) Administrative modernisation

Administrative modernisation measures as a whole have no effect worth mentioning on power positions in the municipal decision-making system if one compares the empirical data from municipalities in an advanced stage of modernisation with the reorganisation of the relationship between politics and administration actually intended by the New Steering Model.(17) So far there is little to be seen in the way of new structures or restructuring in the relationship between council and administration. In local government practice, administrative modernisation primarily affects the organisational aspects of administration, which hardly touch the local political system. Under favourable conditions, the efficiency of administration can be improved, as the example of Detmold (18) shows. It is quite remarkable what success has been achieved through benchmark decisions, budgeting procedures, and changes in committee competencies in inducing decentralised departments, specialised politicians, and local politics as a whole to think within "budgetary limits." This strengthens efficiency thinking not only in the administration but also in the city council. But this increase in efficiency is not connected with the changes in political decision-making structures envisaged in the New Steering Model. Greater efficiency is achieved without disentangling politics and administration to any noteworthy extent, setting up strategic management, improving political decision-making (e.g., by drafting alternative decisions), or reducing detailed intervention. What is decisive for savings performance is acceptance of benchmark decisions and budgeting procedures. Otherwise, political control mechanisms in local government administration are not invalidated.

Administrative modernisation has not modified the way in which the council works and behaves. The idea that political administrative control must primarily target efficiency and will do so permanently if given the chance is true only to a limited extent. Party political competition has a far greater influence on actors. Here are a few examples.

• In the local election year 1999, Detmold for the first time adopted no benchmark decision, and, in view of the narrow majority situation since this election, there have been increasing signs that political arguments have concentrated not only on optimum efficiency in municipal services.



• Enquiries and intervention in implementation processes continue to have a high legitimation value in municipal politics. Many citizens expect local politicians to exert influence on implementation, which they reward at election time. This is also the case in Detmold, although the essential NSM conditions have been established for local politics no longer having to intervene in day-to-day business. But when the next council election comes along the logic of party competition once again takes full effect.



• In local government politics, party competition generally leads to majority parties in the council confronting minority parties, whose relations with the administration vary quite considerably. The council majority parties, in particular, are interested in close links with the administration not only to attain their goals but also because the public often equate administration and majority party. And if the party is to be blamed for administrative "mistakes" or "irregularities," its influence on the administration must be maintained - and this functions best through close ties. This behaviour pattern is in apparent in many cities, e.g., Wuppertal, Hagen, and Detmold, and is in contradiction to the separation recommended by the New Steering Model.



• The case of Detmold also demonstrates that narrow majorities in a direct mayoral election tend to intensify party competition, at least in cities of the size under study, because every party would like to occupy this strategically important position. Before municipal elections, political dissension is markedly greater and often addresses administrative modernisation, since this is considered the purview of the full-time mayor.

Overall, it is apparent that the key NSM assumption that time and information problems are the most important barriers to better political control at the municipal level is completely inadequate. Party competition, specific incentive structures (e.g., constituency relations), the different roles of majority and opposition parties in the council, or the specific personal interests of actors influence political processes at the local level, too, and have to be taken into account in any attempt to improve political administrative control. The repeated problems in implementing the reorganisation of the relationship between politics and administration along lines inspired by the NSM clearly confirm this. The logic of competitive democratic behaviour thus ultimately hinders the unchecked economisation of administration and also the threatening loss of power by the municipal council.

b) Direct election of the mayor

Direct election of the full-time mayor creates an institutional veto position that at least partially diminishes the hitherto absolute precedence of the city council. Empirical evidence shows that the position of the mayor is markedly strengthened (in the direction of executive leadership (19)), although party orientation is in principle maintained. Although the former party monopoly on power is limited by the creation of the mayor's institutional veto position, no pure form of executive leadership comes into being; it combines with party rule. This is remarkable phenomenon, since executive leadership at the local government level has repeatedly been discussed as a countermodel to party competition. The main reason for democracy theory criticism of executive leadership has been the strengthening of administrative domination and the disempowerment of the local council. In NRW these effects have not been so extensively apparent. This is due to a number of factors: the size of the cities under study - where re-election is difficult without party support; to "imperfect" institutionalisation of the direct election compared with Baden-Württemberg (in NRW simultaneous election of mayor and council, shorter period of office, less extensive mayoral personnel powers, inflexible party-list electoral system); to the local political culture (strong parliamentarisation and party politicisation); and to the personality profiles of mayors (40 % are former local politicians, 85 % party members, 87 % party candidates, and 90 % from the community involved).(20)

There is nevertheless a tendency for greater personality orientation with regard to the popularly elected head of the administration. This is because of his interest in re-election, which leads to greater citizen orientation. Full-time mayors therefore seek to show how close they are to the citizens and generally to improve their relations with local residents. Measures introduced with this in view include a mayor's office, favourable public presentation, presence in the local press, representational duties,(21) and greater citizen orientation in internal administrative modernisation through the establishment of "citizen shops," complaints management, and strategic targeting of the "citizen community" (cf., for example, developments in Arnsberg). However, personality orientation need not clash with party interests. There is indeed empirical evidence of an arrangement between full-time mayors and council majority parties in somewhat modified roles. Personality and party orientation need not be contradictory, they can together serve party interests.(22) The direct election of the mayor does not automatically limit party influence, which many had expected in view of experience in South Germany. When majorities are narrow, party competition will be even more intense, since each party wants to occupy this strategically important position. Although top administration is strengthened, party power is, on the whole, not necessarily diminished. However, the city council monopoly on representation is over.

c) Citizen initiative and referendum

In view of the rather small overall number of initiatives and referendums (there has been a popular initiative in just under one in three NRW communities, giving a total between October 1994 and August 1999 of 145), and with a direct success rate of 13 %, local councils have thus not directly lost influence. However, impetus has been given to local decision-making processes. Citizen initiatives and referendums have a considerable anticipatory impact on elected representatives. The possibility alone of citizen initiatives and referendums and the credible menace of their application forces the local council to anticipate citizens intervening in the local government decision-making process by means of these instruments. In many cases in NRW, the fear of an unfavourable referendum outcome has made council majorities more willing to cooperate, even if the actual chance of a successful referendum is relatively low in view of the high quorum required in medium-sized and large communities. The high rate of council adoption of citizen initiatives in NRW or the negotiation of compromises confirm this. Every fourth citizen initiative in NRW is adopted by the local council or the demands formulated are largely taken up in substance. The citizen initiative and referendum gives the citizenry a partial veto position, which can provide the basis for negotiations and compromises, or which can contribute to councils paying greater attention to citizens' concerns of their own accord.

Moreover, one indirect effect is the important articulation function of the instrument, since the subject matter is discussed effectively and the local audience is extended beyond the circle of local elites for the duration of the procedure. Although it should not be forgotten that people who use new forms of exercising political influence have an above-average disposition for conventional political participation, and that asymmetrical participatory behaviour is thus not eliminated, the instrument of the citizen initiative nevertheless enhances the inclination to take part in politics as a whole and leads to greater political involvement. In medium-sized and large cities, the citizen initiative also amplifies political parties' mediating and publicising functions.(23) Regardless of the outcome of an initiative, it may lead to greater citizen participation, or to certain subjects being dealt with at a future date in new forms (round tables, forums).

The two direct democracy elements - direct elections and citizen initiatives - are therefore in principle constraints to negotiate. Especially in structures dominated by party politics like the North Rhine-Westphalian local government decision-making system, the institutional creation of veto positions on the part of local councils causes considerable uncertainty. The creation of - albeit limited - institutionally entrenched possibilities for intervention by the full-time mayor and the citizenry puts pressure on councils to negotiate.

d) Cooperative democracy

The expansion of cooperative forms of democracy tends to reduce the powers of the local council and top administration. Once citizens have become involved through cooperative forms of democracy, considerable momentum can develop. Nonetheless, the loss of power should not be overestimated as a whole, because often comparatively few members of the public prefer the time-consuming, dialogistic procedures to other spare time occupations, so that competence conflicts are kept within limits. And, as a rule, only a modicum of responsibility is transferred to the citizenry. Furthermore, local politics, too, can benefit from cooperative public participation. Certain decisions that have been avoided because of massive acceptance problems on the part of citizens can often be tackled anew only on the basis of an offer of participation. New solutions to problems that serious conflict had seemingly rendered insoluble can often be worked out in dialogue with citizens. Hence, if decisions are no longer made unilaterally but consensus sought with the addressees of the decision and with those affected by it, if the necessary information is secured and opposition reduced, public tasks can be better performed.(24) However, all fundamental issues in urban development as a whole continue to be the responsibility of local politics. Cooperative democracy thus operates only in the shadow of hierarchy and the majority principle. Since cooperation can in principle be withdrawn at any time, the pressure to negotiate does not have as strong an impact as the establishment of veto positions through direct-democracy instruments.

e) Effects on power positions

In sum, the consequences for specific actors are as follows. Through the direct election of the mayor, through the possibility of citizen initiatives, and through the development of cooperative democracy forms (especially the client role), the city council doubtless losses a degree of power. The council's claim to sole power of representation and its generalized powers are now restricted. But any loss of power has been limited by various resistance strategies. They include exerting influence on the state legislature to curb institutional veto rights, the party-political integration of the directly elected mayor, the attempt to concede only symbolic participation in the field of cooperative democracy, and resistance to the envisaged reorganisation of the relationship between the administration and the municipal council in the course of administrative modernisation.

Local political parties are not weakened by direct elections, since without party support candidates for mayor have almost no chance at elections in medium-sized and large cities. The citizen initiative gives both local parties and cooperative forms of democracy an opportunity to gain ground, because parties intervene in local debates or take part in work groups, citizen forums, and the like. Local parties therefore have new possibilities to present themselves over and above their work in the council. In addition, they can win recruits from among the circles who instigate citizen initiatives.

Top administration, i.e., the mayor, gains a much stronger position of power through popular election both within the administration and vis-à-vis the council. Direct legitimation by the people strengths the head of administration considerably. Although he continues to have to rely on the party, the party also has to rely on him, which had not previously been the case to this extent. The development of cooperative-democracy elements can also enhance the mayor's power position, because, if he supports them, they generally improve his chances of re-election and hardly curb his powers. Only the citizen initiative could eventually constrain his position.

Those who gain most are the citizens and civic groups. Their political position is upgraded both by the direct election of the mayor, the citizen initiative and referendum, and by the development of cooperative democratic elements. The scope for influencing municipal decision-making processes has markedly widened, even if still more ways of exerting influence are certainly possible in all areas. Overall, there is an increase in "vying for the citizen." Given citizens' growing scope for exercising influence, the city council, the parties, and top administration are finding it more and more important to take due note of their interests and concerns.

Local council actors in NRW thus found themselves increasingly constrained to negotiate in the 90s owing to the advance of negotiation-democracy procedures. Pressure to negotiate in the form of formal veto positions is produced by the direct-democracy instruments of the mayoral election and the popular initiative, pressure to negotiate through cooperation in the shadow of hierarchy or the majority principle builds as cooperative forms of democracy develop. Overall, these mechanisms have meant that, in cities of the size under study, the monopoly of party competition on power is coming to an end.

Although both the popular election of the mayor and the citizen initiative have in fact only partially restricted the parties' claim to sole representation, the effects of these instruments should not be underestimated. The existence of direct-democracy procedures can be seen as an institutional incentive for negotiation arrangements and for responsive politics. In contradiction to Holtmann's (25) arguments, direct democratic forms of decision-making do not hinder negotiation democracy: they help it. In NRW, too, majority parties in local councils must now get used to permitting negotiations. This potentially strengthens the "weaker" constraint to negotiate, cooperation in the shadow of the majority principle.

This does not mean that party competition has been superseded in NRW. First, local council actors have been able to avoid too drastic a loss of power through counter-strategies. Second, the extent of party politicisation is not only a reflection of local constitutional arrangements but also depends on the size of the community, the pressure of problems and potential for conflict in important policy areas, or the parliamentary self-conception of younger council members, especially Green members of the council. Lehmbruch's argument that parties assume an important orientation function with increasing size of community continues to be valid.(26) Against the background of the starting situation, the political culture, and the specific institutional arrangements, parties in NRW continue to be very influential, especially in medium-sized and large cities. Furthermore, party competition has been intensified by another institutional development, the abolition of the five-percent hurdle since the 1999 local government elections. An average of one party or voter group more has now entered NRW local councils. In 1994 there had been an average 3.56 parties per municipality. Now there are 4.41. The number of voters' associations has also increased from 188 to 276.(27) The greater range of parties is a key factor in explaining differences between federal, state, and local elections, and thus contributes to intensifying competition. To this extent, a certain reverse effect is apparent.

In sum, the structures for the democratic representation of interests in the NRW local government decision-making system are becoming more differentiated, representative forms of decision-making are being enriched by direct-democracy and cooperative elements.(28) Even if power losses by representative decision-making institutions are limited, it seems that representative decision-making will inevitably find its predominance tempered, since the effects of modernisation are likely to be mutually reinforcing. In essence, it is a matter of allowing new direct-democracy and cooperative forms of decision-making on the basis of representative forms, and institutionally balancing the relationship between the two. This pressure will scarcely be avoidable. These changes - increasingly discussed under the catchword "citizen community" - will make new demands on council, administration, and citizenry.(29)

As regards the discussion on the impact of different local government constitutional elements, with its long tradition, it appears that the adoption of central points of the South German council constitution (direct election; citizen initiative and referendum) in NRW will not have the same effects as in Baden-Württemberg. Well-established decision-making cultures do not change so rapidly, despite amendments to constitutional law. The starting situation, the political culture, the institutional arrangements, and the size of municipalities in NRW differ from what is to be found in the South German system. With the upgrading of top administration and citizenry and the tendency for diminished local council power, there are both marked convergence with the South German system and continuing differences. The city council is still more powerful in NRW, executive leadership has combined with continued party rule, personality and party orientation have coalesced.

(1) The local government decision-making system can be understood only in the interaction between local decision-makers (council, administration, mayor, district representatives), the citizenry, community intermediary institutions (associations, societies, civic action groups, political parties, the media), and the federal government, state governments, and the European Union. It is determined by complex institutional arrangements - legal terms of reference, guidelines, and interlinkage with the federal government, state governments and the EU - and actor strategies at the local level.

(2) In this context decision-making processes are understood as both information processing and power processes. Information processing is the main focus of behavioural-science decision theory; the analysis of power processes has been undertaken by, for example, Crozier/Friedberg (1979); for strategic organisational analysis see Bogumil/Schmid (2001: 33 ff.).

(3) Cf. Bovermann (1999); Gehne (2000); Holtkamp (2000b); Osner (2001); Paust (1999); Schulenburg (1999).

(4) On the subject of administrative modernization, empirical material has been used which was obtained through collaboration in modernization processes in Hagen (pop. 220 000), Detmold (pop. 74 000) and Wuppertal (pop. 390 000) between 1994 and 1999; and in the field of civic engagement in Arnsberg (pop. 79 000) and Essen (pop. 600 000) between 1998 to 1999. Experience in the "Communities of the Future" network by the Hans Böckler Foundation, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the KGSt was also useful for the two areas under study.

(5) With reference to Lehmbruch (1976), negotiation democracy can be seen as denoting political systems "which, although they operate to a limited extent with party competition and on the majority principle, place greater emphasis on decision-making through 'bargaining'." (cf. Gerhard Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, Opladen 1976, ibid.: 14 f.).

(6) In contrast, for example, to Gerhard Banner (1999), for whom only substantive decisions by citizens are forms of direct democracy, and for whom the popular election of the mayor is consequently a representative instrument since it is concerned with selecting representatives, I consider direct elections for the position of mayor to be an instrument of direct democracy: for a direct personnel decision is made bypassing representatives.

(7) However, with reference to Czada's argument (2000) that there are various dimensions of negotiation democracy, it should be pointed out that direct and cooperative forms of local government democracy develop divergent political action logics. The two direct-democracy elements (direct election and referendum) impose constraints to negotiate by force of formal veto positions. They limit the majority principle that predominates in party competition, since they create institutional veto positions. Procedures for cooperative public participation, in contrast, can be assigned to the field of consensus organisation in the shadow of hierarchy or the majority principle.

(8) Cf. on this subject and following Bogumil (2001a: 46 ff.); basics on local decision-making system: Grauhan (1970); Derlien et al. (1976); Banner (1982).

(9) Historically, local self-government and the modern State had been increasingly bracketed since the beginning of the 19th century. The integration of municipalities into the State continued after the First World War. The financial reform of 1919/1920 completed the mutual interdependence between the State and local authorities that had been developing since the beginning of the 19th century. It ended a process of integrating municipalities into the State and of communizing the State that had in fact been proceeding since 1870 (cf. Bogumil [2001a: 37 ff.]).

(10) This might be one reason why local governance studies in, for example, the United Kingdom, are closely associated with political systems and governmental studies, while in Germany the local level is still largely ignored in this discourse.

(11) Even if corporatist arrangements are not so much in evidence at the local level, this does not mean that associations are unimportant at the local level. But they often exert influence outside corporatist arrangements.

(12) Cf. Bogumil (2001a: 20 ff.).

(13) Unlike private enterprises, local government administration has dual legitimation, practically incorporating two forms of organisation in one. On the one hand, it is a political organisation, a local political "governmental system" which obeys the laws of political logic in which competitive relations (for votes) dominate and which is concerned with effectiveness (political controllability, political goal-attainment) and democratic legitimation (political consensus, political acceptability and enforceability). On the other hand, the local authority is a work organisation, an organisation for processing and carrying out certain tasks, in which the central concern is cooperation and efficiency (economic resource deployment). However, it is a specific work organisation, namely a public administrative organisation, which is conditionally programmed in the tradition of Max Weber, and for which legality (correct application of the law) is a central rationality criterion (cf. Bogumil 2001a: 31). This dual legitimation basis is an essential reason for the wide-spread tensions between local councils and administration.

(14) Following Baden-Württemberg (1956) and the East German states, the citizen referendum and citizen initiative were inserted in the local government statutes of Schleswig-Holstein (1990), Hesse (1993), Rhineland-Palatinate (1993), North Rhine-Westphalia (1994), Bremen (1994), Bavaria (1995), Lower Saxony (1996), the Saarland (1997) and Hamburg (1998). Germany has thus joined an exclusive "club". Switzerland and Denmark are the only other countries in Europe that have local referendums.

(15) Direct democracy is a form of public choice, conflict regulation, and decision-making in which those affected by decisions bypass representatives in making substantive or personnel decisions (cf. Luthardt/Waschkuhn 1997: 72). In the case of substantive decisions the instruments to be mentioned are the popular initiative, popular petition, and referendum at the federal and state levels, and the citizen initiative and citizen referendum at the local level; in the case of personnel decisions they are the direct election of the mayor or county chief executive officer (Landrat) at the local level. Direct democracy is not understood in this connection as an alternative to representative democracy but as another form of decision-making procedure.

(16) However, there continue to be marked differenced in institutional arrangements from state to state in Germany, as regards, for example, the double leadership system, the distribution of powers between the council and the administration, the mayoral term of office, the implementation conditions for citizen initiatives and referendums, and the possibility of vote accumulation (a candidate on a list can receive up to three votes) and splitting (candidates on a list can be "fetched" to the other list). Only NRW, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein still have an inflexible party-list electoral system.

(17) On the difficult relationship between council and administration cf. von Kodolitsch (2000: 199).

(18) Detmold is among the most progressive local authorities in Germany with regard to modernisation (cf. Osner 2001; own surveys). From a very early date Detmold can be considered to have been a modernisation city with a mixture of comprehensive goal-orientation, new organisational structures, and political reform. Since 1993 the municipality has relatively rapidly introduced an area-wide budgeting procedure (1995), a new departmental structure (1995, 28 offices were converted into 9 departments), accompanied by a reduction in the number and a mirror-image assignment of committees (reduction from 17 to 9), subannual reporting (1996), the submission of a product-oriented budget with 154 products (1997) and participatory management.

(19) Cf. on the concept Grauhan (1970), on the statements relating to NRW Schulenburg (1999: 293).

(20) Mayor profiles in NRW and Baden-Württemberg differ very greatly with respect to mayoral independence and local residence, and considerably with respect to previous position (cf. Bogumil 2001 a: 188 ff.; on the data cf. Gehne 2000). Among full-time mayors in NRW, party orientation predominates even after direct election, especially in medium-sized and large cities. However, as in Baden-Württemberg, there are increasing signs of pure personality elections in smaller municipalities subsumed under counties.

(21) Representational duties have in practice played a more important role for the full-time mayor in NRW than for municipal director or non-salaried mayor, cf. Schulenburg (1999: 385).

(22) Municipal elections are neither primarily party elections nor predominantly personality elections. Even if, owing to the lack of research data on local elections, it is unclear how big the specific segments are and what factors are responsible, there can be no doubt that a not inconsiderable segment of the electorate are party political in their voting behaviour and a similarly significant segment tend to be personality oriented. This being the case, it is also necessary from the party point of view to admit personality elements over and beyond party orientation.

(23) on this subject and on the systematisation of various forms of effect see Lackner (1999: 69 ff.).

(24) Cf. Bogumil (2001b).

(25) Cf. Holtmann (1999: 187-211).

(26) Cf. Lehmbruch (1972: 3-8). But this also means that, over a certain size, party influence cannot be significantly limited at will.

(27) Cf. Holtkamp (2000a: 11).

(28) The thesis, which still needs empirical underpinning, is that this is also the case in other German states in medium-sized and large cities. In a certain sense, Baden-Württemberg can be regarded as an exception, since direct democracy instruments have long existed in this state and there are few municipalities in this size category. However, the advance of cooperative democracy elements seems to be in evidence there, too.

(29) Cf. Bogumil/Czada/Holtkamp (2000).

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