Demographic Decline, Segregation, and Social Urban Renewal in Old Industrial Metropolitan Areas

Klaus Peter Strohmeier and Silvia Bader

Demographic Decline, Segregation, and Social Urban Renewal in Old Industrial Metropolitan Areas

1. Demographic Development and Segregation
    1.1 The Social Background, Key Data, and Perspectives of Demographic Development
    1.2 Regional Trends and Structures in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Importance of Immigration for Demographic Development
    1.3 The Demographic Challenge for Towns and Cities
    1.4 Dimensions of Segregation in North Rhine-Westphalian Cities
    1.5 Increase in Segregation or Concentrated Accumulation of Social Problems in Urban Districts
2. Social Spatial Structures, Social Milieus and Social Problems
    2.1 Social Exclusion, Non-Integration, and Desolidarization
    2.2 "Integration through Internal Integration," "Parallel Society" or "Transnationality"
    2.3 Local Integration and Identification in Poor Districts.
    2.4 "Development Pessimists" in "Democracy-Free Zones"
3. Integration through Participation
    3.1 Civic Engagement Models in the District with Special Development Needs
    3.2 The Project Types: "Help Decide!", "Join In!" and "Do-It-Yourself Projects"
4. Conclusion

Notes
References

Abstract:
Shrinking cities, ageing population, and increasing social segregation are typical of cities in the metropolitan core of North Rhine-Westphalia. Urban society is "de-integrating" and social deprivation is concentrating in certain urban districts. In the Ruhr District the northern areas of cities are most affected, which are still strongly marked by the recent coal and steel past. The social integration of the population as well as political and civil society participation are declining. The majority of the coming generation are growing up in this urban milieu. Promoting participation can help reduce disadvantagement. This suggests approaches and strategies for action.

 

1. Demographic Development and Segregation

The political and administrative authorities in post-war Germany, having ignored demographic development for decades, have at last begun to understand that developments in birth rates and population figures are evidence of fundamental changes in society and harbingers of far-reaching change. But the dynamics of demographic development and its effects are still largely unknown, especially at the local level. The impact and extent of the anticipated decline in (native) population and the qualitative and quantitative significance of migration for community life, for "urban society," especially in West German metropolitan areas, have been notoriously underestimated. In a few years time the majority of the population there will have an "immigrant background."

The scope of political influence on the population process is overestimated. Even if it proved possible to overcome the "structural thoughtlessness" towards the family prevailing in German politics, industry, and society - which was described as long ago as 1994 in the federal government's Fifth Family Report - by adopting family promotion policies, and if birth figures were consequently to rise (which is by no means certain), it would take decades before such a renaissance of the family again produced natural growth in the German population.

In the urban metropolitan core, the family is now the way of life of a dwindling minority of households (16 per cent in Essen) and more and more a way of life for the poor and for foreigners.

 

1.1 The Social Background, Key Data, and Perspectives of Demographic Development

The fall in births since the mid-1960s and the subsequent persistently low birth rates reflect (irreversible) societal changes (educational expansion, legal equality, individualisation) - which gave women in particular hitherto unheard of scope for shaping their lives - but which have been accompanied by traditional, in effect family-hostile social policy designed to relieve mothers from the need to work without offering adequate child care.

The German population in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) has been shrinking since the early 1970s. Model calculations by the NRW State Office for Statistics and Data Processing (LDS) on the age structure of the population show that the particularly large birth cohort around 1965 was much bigger than its parents' generation. However, only just under two-thirds of that generation are replaced by their children. Thus when the baby boom generation of the 1960s dies, waves of implosive population decline threaten unless substantial immigration intervenes.

In NRW foreigners are younger than the Germans living there. Figure 1 shows the age structure of these sections of the population on a distorted scale (age cohorts as proportions of total German and non-German population).

If the two population groups were the same size, the majority of young adults, adolescents, and children would today be of non-German origin. In fact, the proportion of foreigners in NRW is 11 per cent. In some metropolitan core districts, however, the majority of younger age groups is already non-German. In NRW county boroughs, according to model calculations by Birg (2001), the proportion of immigrants among young adults, children, and adolescents will exceed the 50 per cent mark from 2010. In the foreseeable future, immigrants will hence constitute the majority of the urban population in North Rhine-Westphalia.

The causes of this development are to be found in the differential reproductive behaviour of the German and non-German populations and in the residential location behaviour of the German population.

Half of non-German households are families with children. Only one quarter of the households of the German population consist of families with children (cf. fig. 2). Most foreigners live in cities. Without them, the household and age structures of the urban population would be even more problematic, and without them population decline in West German cities would be even more serious.

   

1.2 Regional Trends and Structures in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Importance of Immigration for Demographic Development

The large cities in North Rhine-Westphalia, especially those in the Ruhr District metropolitan core, are shrinking owing both to outmigration to suburban areas and to an excess of deaths over births. Without exception, peripheral counties record migration gains and (in some cases) even an excess of births over deaths. They are becoming the family zone of the mobile German middle classes, while the cities are increasingly being abandoned as residential locations by these population groups.

 

Without foreigners the shrinking of cities in the metropolitan core of NRW would be much more serious than it is. Given the "youthful" age structure of the foreign population, this is true above all for the coming generation of children and adolescents.

In the Ruhr District as a whole, the number of children fell by about one third between 1970 and 2000. In communities in which the number of children has dropped to less than two-thirds of the 1970 level since that date, foreigners constitute almost one third of this age group. Where the number of children has not fallen or where, despite a decline in births, there were more children at the end of the century than thirty years previously, in the communities of the Westphalian and Lower-Rhine fringe of the coalfields, there are practically no foreigners.

 1.3 The Demographic Challenge for Towns and Cities

In local and regional policy, the demographic challenge has so far been perceived at best in outline. Two different development paths are emerging.

 

In the coming years, demographic ageing (which will not be dealt with here) will primarily affect the growing rural suburban areas with their still relatively young age structure. The question is whether the (then adult) child generation of the "suburbanisers" of the 1980s and 1990s will stay in the suburbs as adults or whether they will abandon outlying areas for the core cities. The same question applies for the parent generation when the "empty nest" phase is reached.

Ageing is already a problem in the shrinking cities of the metropolitan core. It is accompanied by the repercussions of demographic decline and the need to integrate a growing young generation of immigrants.

In the major shrinking cities of West Germany with their dwindling economic and financial capacities, immigrants, including ethnic German immigrants from eastern Europe, already constitute the majority of the population in certain urban districts, and in the decade to come this will be the case in all cities of the North Rhine-Westphalian metropolitan core. In the light of these radical changes in the metropolitan core, the "intercultural opening of the administration" is more than an optional favour to be granted to a minority.

And, we have shown in an expert report for the Projekt Ruhr GmbH (Strohmeier 2002), many major NRW cities, which are experiencing growing, concentrated polarisation in the social situations of the various population groups, face both of these demographic challenges at one and the same time.

 1.4 Dimensions of Segregation in North Rhine-Westphalian Cities

With a simple set of indicators, including a small number of social structure variables, we have developed a living conditions classification of county and city population for NRW state health reporting, which permits regional differences in average life expectancy to be explained statistically, i.e., to be accurately forecast.

Cities and rural areas differ in their position relative to the "A factor," a sort of negative "social stock market index" (cf. figure 4). Certain cities in the northern Ruhr District show the highest values with the highest proportions of unemployed, poor, and foreign residents, as well as the strongest population decline. All counties and cities also differ through their position on the second axis, the prosperity axis, formed above all by disposable per capita income. Düsseldorf leads the field and the municipalities of the Emscher Zone bring up the rear. The differences on both axes have increased since the 1990s, which points to a rise in social and social-space differences in NRW.

Polarising tendencies, such as those apparent in comparing the social structures of cities as a whole, are to be found within cities, as well. The urban sociologist calls this segregation, meaning the degree of unequal distribution of the resident population over the territory of a city in terms of social status characteristics (social status of residential areas), of family forms and life styles (family status), and in terms of the ratio of Germans to immigrants. Indicators of segregation in the urban districts of all county boroughs in North Rhine-Westphalia are shown in figure 5. We measure the social rank position of urban districts by the proportion of blue-collar workers (mean of all urban districts equals zero, high values indicate a low proportion of blue-collar workers); family status by the young-age dependency ratio (corresponding more or less to the proportion of under 18s in the population, average zero) and the proportion of foreigners. It transpires that while most urban districts in NRW have a below-average proportion of foreigners (under 11 per cent), a few have a very high proportion.

 

In 1970 and 1987, when the last two censuses were held, the proportion of foreigners was not yet an independent aspect of the social-space differentiation of living conditions in urban districts (cf. Kersting/Strohmeier 1996). The two other dimensions, social rank and family status, were statistically independent. In other words, there were family-oriented and less family-oriented poor neighbourhoods, and there were family-oriented and less family-oriented well-to-do neighbourhoods.

The proportion of foreigners, which had hitherto been of no independent importance as a structural characteristic, now gives the best classification of social situations at the urban district level; the previously independent indicators of social rank and family status correlate strongly with each other and with the proportion of foreigners. This means that most of poor and most (poor) children live where the most foreigners are to be found in cities.

The cities of the Ruhr District metropolitan core display social-space structures that cross city bounds. North Essen, with a high proportion of foreign residents, low social rank, and a high young-age dependency ratio (family status) continues into South Gelsenkirchen.

 1.5 Increase in Segregation or Concentrated Accumulation of Social Problems in Urban Districts

There is no clear evidence that ethnic segregation, the spatial separation of Germans and foreigners, has increased everywhere over time. The percentages of foreigners in, for example, Essen, have risen almost everywhere over the past decades, particularly strongly in less populated urban districts with fewer foreign residents.

Over the same period, however, social segregation (or poverty segregation) and demographic segregation have increased. Almost two-thirds of children and adolescents in Essen now live in the poor northern part of the city, north of the A40, the motorway which almost cuts across the city as a sort of social equator. The North-South gap is typical for most major cities in the Ruhr District.

 

Foreigners live predominantly were the poor "natives" live and the most children grow up. In these neighbourhoods we now find both an accumulation of social problems and a rapid decline in political and civil-society participation reflecting the prevailing attitude of resignatory, apathetic pessimism about the possibility of changing things. It is fatal that the majority of the coming generation of urban society (including most young immigrants) is growing up in this milieu.

 2. Social Spatial Structures, Social Milieus and Social Problems

 2.1 Social Exclusion, Non-Integration, and Desolidarization

In the study "Les quartiers d'exil" by Dubet and Lapeyronnie (Dubet/Lapeyronnie 1994), the social problems of the vast, anonymous housing estates in the Paris banlieue and the substantial transformations taking place in the proletarian urban under classes are described. Although in Germany these change are different in quality, they are more and more in evidence here, too. In North Rhine-Westphalian urban working class housing estates, not only in the Ruhr District, traditional working class forms of settlement are eroding. This is due to the disappearance of jobs in big and heavy industry and the security associated with them (e.g., company housing tied to the job and neighbours who were also workmates), to the privatisation of housing stock and the spread of precarious employment. In former company housing estates, social conditions are now often marked by fluctuation and anonymity. From the urban development point of view, too, these neighbourhoods have little quality to offer. Often the infrastructure has been neglected, old housing stock has been inadequately or not at all rehabilitated, land use density is high. These are all factors that damage the image of urban districts, so that less and less is invested. A downwards spiral is set in motion.

In the major publicly-assisted housing estates the problems are similar even if the causes are different, often owing to administratively generated segregation.

In the poorest and most problem-laden districts of cities, which are also home to most immigrants, high fluctuation rates mean (in mathematical terms) that the population will have been completely replaced within only a few years. In unstable neighbourhoods, informal solidarity resources are eroding, which were once characteristic of working-class areas, especially in the Ruhr District.

 

2.2 "Integration through Internal Integration," "Parallel Society" or "Transnationality"

The urban sociological literature offers various interpretations of the life situation and life opportunities of immigrants living in segregation. They differ in outcome, namely in the integration and participation opportunities of migrants. But they also differ as regards boundary conditions, including both social-structural and socio-cultural preconditions and quasi-"objective" characteristics - jobs, educational opportunities.

The "integration through internal integration" model sees the segregated, ethnically homogeneous community of immigrants as a sort of non-violent shelter and as an integration lock through which the second generation, provided with the qualifications of the host society's educational system and with equal rights, can enter this society - which means leaving the ghetto. The similarity with the American Dream of the early twentieth century is obvious.

The "parallel society" interpretation shifts the perspective and emphasises the problem of social control. It is based on the observation that immigrants do not leave their ghetto, that internal integration does not lead to integration. The ethnic community which immigrants may experience as a non-violent shelter is seen from outside as a "unlegislated area" in which the rules of the host society do not apply. Parallel societies are threatening and not to be tolerated.

"Transnationality," finally, is a situational description that takes account of social and technological changes in modern society and relates them to the life situation of immigrants. Today, unlike two or three decades ago, all immigrants live in constant communicative and mass-media contact with their society of origin through modern communication media. Moreover, travel is no longer an insurmountable problem nor inordinately expensive. Parts of the annual seasonal cycle and life cycle are spent in the society of origin. People practically live in several places at the same time. For immigrants with few occupational and educational opportunities for integration, this means, for example, living in districts like Bruckhausen and in Turkey with their backs to the "host society." Bruckhausen is part of their "personal Turkey." It is different for immigrants with a chance of social positioning in the host society. They are no less transnational, as far as constant communicative proximity and the frequency of direct contacts with the society of origin are concerned. But they do not need the "ecology" of the ghetto to live. In fact, immigrants who have "made it" leave the segregated poor districts and move to what estate agents call "better" localities.

Which of these models comes to bear is decided firstly in the labour market. A society with an economy that needs labour (a great deal and low-skilled) integrates immigrants and easily teaches them skills on the job. A society with a shrinking labour market uses ethnic attributes as exclusion and discrimination criteria. Any immigrant who lacks education has no chance of integrating (i.e., attaining a valuable place in society). But whoever, having lost out in the transnational scenario, sees no prospects for himself and his children in a society in which he does not really live, expects no benefit from opportunities for participation or in educational measures including language training, however early on they are offered.

In the Ruhr District every fifth non-German school-leaver does not complete his or her secondary school education. The rate of people with no school qualifications is three times higher among foreigners than among Germans. Most foreigners have no more than secondary school qualifications (Hauptschule).

Existing educational facilities reinforce social differences instead of compensating them. The vast majority of the (many) children in North Essen go on to general secondary school (Hauptschule) or comprehensive school (Gesamtschule) after their primary education. In the well-off South the grammar school (Gymnasium), which prepares students for tertiary education, is the usual choice.

 

2.3 Local Integration and Identification in Poor Districts.

A comparative analysis of the spatial distribution of violent/robbery offences and alleged offenders' places of residence shows a concentration of the two in a few poor neighbourhoods with a high population fluctuation rate (more than 100 per cent in less than four years), with anonymous living conditions, a high proportion of foreigners, high social assistance rates, and a high percentage of single mothers and children in ill health (Strohmeier 2001). But there are also poor neighbourhoods with a high percentage of foreigners that do not suffer from these social problems to such an extreme extent. The difference lies in the stability of social conditions. Fluctuation in the population (migration in relation to the total population) and political participation (voter turnout at local elections) are easily available indicators for pinpointing such particularly problematic urban districts and their milieus.

 2.4 "Development Pessimists" in "Democracy-Free Zones"

In most poor neighbourhoods with high population fluctuation and high proportions of foreigners (of whom by far the majority have no vote), over two-thirds of those eligible to vote do not go to the polls or take part in public life in any other way. Owing to the circumstances of life in the district and their own experience of life, mistrust and resignatory, apathetic pessimism about the efficacy of remedial action are presumably a rational attitude among the poor.

In the case of Essen it can be shown that political participation, measured in terms of voter turnout in local elections, declines in proportion to the percentage of foreign residents. But it falls with rising fluctuation. At the same time, there is a positive link between high fluctuation rates (as evidence of unstable social conditions) and high proportions of immigrants. But there are districts with high percentages of foreigners and ethnic German immigrants which nevertheless show an above-average voter turnout. Low population fluctuation makes the difference. What is decisive for local integration (turnout for local elections being an indicator of local integration and public identification with the community) is accordingly stable social conditions. The higher fluctuation is, the higher the proportion of immigrants and the lower political participation. The positive link between fluctuation and the percentage of foreigners among the population (the higher the fluctuation the more immigrants) is the result of housing market processes. Immigrants live in the least stable districts. The negative link between fluctuation and participation (the more fluctuation the less participation) describes the collective result of individual withdrawal behaviour by residents, which can be regarded as a perfectly rational behavioural strategy in the anonymous, poor milieus of the big city.

The Essen findings point to fluctuation in the neighbourhood as a factor that considerably influences social participation. And it is a fact that the differences in political participation between urban districts are statistically almost as well explained by the fluctuation rate as by the proportion of immigrant residents. The untypical cases - poor neighbourhoods with many foreigners and high participation - are areas that enjoy relatively stable social conditions and a relatively high degree of "sedentariness" among residents.

 

3. Integration through Participation

Voter turnout for local elections is also a good indicator of other forms of political and civil-society participation. In districts, including those with a high proportion of immigrants, in which voter turnout is low and population fluctuation is high, there are hardly any associations or other forms of organised civic participation. This type of urban district is a field of action for integrated urban district development programmes like "Socially Integrative City" or (in NRW) "Districts with Special Development Needs." The objective of these programmes is the urban-development, social, and economic renewal of deprived residential neighbourhoods. This renewal includes the improvement and enhancement of civic engagement, social integration, and identification of residents with "their" neighbourhood. The goal is to be reached through a range of participation opportunities. Participation is thus both end and means.

 

3.1 Civic Engagement Models in the District with Special Development Needs

The impact model that emerges from a comparative analysis of action concepts in the NRW state programme is a sort of "magic triangle."

 

Participation by residents brings greater integration (in the sense of more intensive social relations) and this in turn leads to greater identification with the district and the people there, resulting in a greater probability of further participation. The model anticipates an upwards spiral. In fact, the spiral in the highly unstable milieu of (native and immigrant) development pessimists in urban underclasses often turns downwards. For participation presupposes a certain measure of social integration and local identification. The thresholds for participation in the district are often too high for the real addressees, the "outsiders" of urban society, so that the "establishment" keep themselves to themselves in the upwards spiral.

Forms of participation are often in keeping with classical middle-class civic standards. As a rule, the privileged middle classes have no difficulty articulating and defending their interests. If round tables, structured public meetings, or district conferences are organised, the disadvantaged population groups are excluded anyway. They do not feel they are the addressees, and see no possibility of improving their situation through participation.

The problem is the lack of social integration among people in anonymous neighbourhoods with high "population turnover," and the question is how precisely these disadvantaged residents can be integrated in neighbourhood networks so that the impact model of district renewal can generate the desired upward trend. The right approach must be found. It lies in people's individual utility orientation.

 

3.2 The Project Types: "Help Decide!", "Join In!" and "Do-It-Yourself Projects"

Most approaches to social urban renewal take as their point of departure a sort of participatory fast-selling mechanism: "the community use of premises and their availability for interested groups in the district is designed ? to promote and stabilise communication and cooperation between different groups, generations, and cultures and to eliminate social disadvantagement" (Stadt Hagen 1995). This is how one action concept is presented. And: "A citizen centre is being established in the centre of the city which will not least of all generate positive identification with the district through the active participation of the residents" (ibid.). The hope that participation opportunities will create participation is somewhat naïve in a milieu of poverty. This type of project, which we refer to as "join-in" or "help decide" projects, has little activation potential for marginalised actors pessimistic about the prospects for formative action, however much they might aspire to citizen focus. The same is true of district conferences and discussion rounds. These are primarily participation opportunities for people who are already socially integrated.

A look through the action programmes of the Ruhr District cities involved in the NRW state programme "Districts with Special Development Needs" (Austermann/ Himmer-Hegmann 2001) shows that besides these "help decide" projects with limited activation potential there are two other types that at first glance have nothing to do with "public participation" (at least not in the sense of political co-determination and collaboration). They are a variety of projects of a type that we choose to call "do-it-yourself projects," as well as job creation and skills acquisition projects.

In DIY projects, citizens are involved in the performance of municipal functions and enjoy a direct, short-term benefit from this involvement. The importance of successful participation in such projects not only for the municipality and the district but also for the participants themselves, for their self-confidence, for the gain in trust in the social environment, and for the generation of elementary social networks, is completely overlooked by most action concepts. Only the Essen municipality has gone into the more forward-looking social and municipal importance of these projects in its principles of "social municipal policy" (cf. Stadt Essen/ISSAB 1993). DIY projects (and skills acquisition measures, which recruit their clientele from the residential area and not on an alphabetical principle), establish networks among people and also save costs, because citizens perform functions through personal work, like "school-yard greening" projects or various neighbourhood improvement measures, which are really the job of the municipality or the housing industry. Do-it-yourself projects are low-threshold participation opportunities for mistrustful and non-integrated people, too, if the input and benefit are calculable. People are more or less "won over" by the expectation of direct benefits. They see that something improves if they do it themselves. Their initial self-interested participation in the project generates the secondary effect of social networks and integration, which means that "self-help" structures and social control mechanisms come into being and identification with the neighbourhood and its people is nurtured.

 

4. Conclusion

We have shown that demographic development poses enormous challenges for the shrinking cities of the North Rhine-Westphalian metropolitan core. Disadvantaged population groups - the poor, the old, and foreigners - will in future predominate in urban society. The causes lie both in selective migration, especially outmigration by the German middle classes to the suburbs, and in the demographic ageing of society. The population that remains behind is often old or poor and non-German in origin. Owing to the differential age structure of the German and non-German populations, the greater part of the population in North Rhine-Westphalian cities will in the near future come from an immigrant background even if no further immigration takes place.

Population groups threatened by poverty and exclusion concentrate particularly strongly in certain urban areas in which social problems accumulate. Such "Districts with Special Development Needs" will multiply in the years to come, and there is urgent need for action to avoid further clefts in urban society.

The precondition for participation is social integration and the identification of residents with their city and their district. New paths to civic participation must be taken to reach the socially disadvantaged. The starting point for such forms of participation is to appeal to the their individual utility for habitually mistrustful, poor people in socially unstable neighbourhoods. "Do-it-yourself projects" offer benefits that can be realised in the short term and which require low input, so that even socially non-integrated residents can be reached. Social integration and identification are in a certain sense a side product of an essentially self-interested engagement. In this way it is perhaps possible to establish a precondition for greater political participation in poor urban districts, which, owing to low political representation in local politics now practically constitute "democracy-free zones" in urban society.

 

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